

MEMORANDUM FOR:

STAT  
Executive Registry

77-3603

Aides approved this talking  
paper for Adam Turner & me.  
Although some (see list) of  
the cabinet members have  
received the Consumers Guide  
to Intelligence, we suggest he  
consider passing out copies to other  
members at the meeting - Note it  
is classified SECRET. *ATM*

Date

3/3.

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FOR DCI)

28 February 1977

PROPOSED REMARKS BY ADMIRAL TURNER AT THE FIRST CABINET SESSION HE ATTENDS:

I welcome the invitation of the President to share a few of my thoughts with the members of his Cabinet.

The intelligence business differs markedly from the work of the other major departments and agencies of our Government.

- Our primary customers are top-level officials within the Federal Government itself, although extensive support is provided to mid-level and staff elements as well.
- Your customers are primarily outside the Federal Government--individual American citizens or local governments, or industries, or international organizations or foreign governments.

In today's world almost every area of human activity has the potential for impacting on our national security. So, in a very true sense, I am meeting today with my major customers, the primary users of the intelligence we devote so much attention to collecting and analyzing.

I am told that we only spend about seven cents of each intelligence dollar on analysis and production--and that the bulk of our resources are expended on highly sophisticated technical collection and processing systems.

But it is the end product--the estimates, the current reporting, the analytic memoranda--on which the Intelligence Community is judged.

The President and members of the National Security Council are going to assess my performance as DCI in large measure on how well I see to it that you are provided with the intelligence you need.

- On how adequately you are warned concerning upcoming crises;
- On how responsive our estimates are to your planning needs;

- On how comprehensively our foreign technical data meets your needs in the planning and development of U.S. weapons systems;
- On how well our information prepares you concerning foreign positions in international negotiations.
- On how effective our foreign counterintelligence uncovers hostile intelligence service activities against you.

My reason for mentioning this is to solicit your support.

I have been reminded again in the course of my briefings and reading to prepare for my new job that the communications link is critical to the policy-intelligence relationship. There is a failure in communication:

- If the policymaker fails to make his needs known, even to his own staff, and the intelligence officer has to guess. He may miss.
- If U.S. objectives or actions are so closely held that intelligence officers, unaware of what their own Government is seeking to accomplish, misinterpret evidence of a foreign reaction.

I solicit your thoughtful assistance.

- As I settle into the job, I will be evaluating how well my National Intelligence Officers and other senior intelligence officials are doing in maintaining liaison with the users of intelligence products and identifying customer needs.
- It would be helpful if you would review your own procedures for acquainting your intelligence officers or other officials with your needs for intelligence support.
- What problems are you most concerned about now?
- What do you expect will be key problem areas for attention in three months? In six months?

- It would also be helpful if you would insure that information about foreign activities of potential value to all of us, which you may derive in the course of your department's work, is made available. Making such information available can help me allocate collection resources more effectively and economically.

I put this emphasis on our ability to provide timely, high quality, very responsive intelligence because, while problems and challenges remain, I am convinced that I am inheriting the senior post in an Intelligence Community composed of talented and dedicated people whose capabilities have served this country well.

- I make this assessment despite the resource limitations and the reduced manpower that the Community has had to adjust to over the past several years.
- And despite some adverse developments arising from the recent investigations and the consequent publicity given to intelligence activities.
- The impact of the recent investigations is still being felt. We are attempting:
  - to restore our damaged overseas liaison relationships;
  - to redevelop sources who withdrew their support for fear of publicity;
  - to sustain the creativity of U.S. intelligence personnel, and
  - to strengthen Congressional and public confidence in the way intelligence activities are conducted.

The time has come to deal with the present and plan for the future--not look back on the past.

In the collection field:

- All three of our major collection sources--signals intelligence, imagery, and human resources--are making major contributions to our information base.

- Nevertheless, there are some gaps. Our information on some of the countries important to U.S. interests is not as good as I would like. We must find ways to sustain the aggressive and creative qualities which have been fundamental to so many of the intelligence successes of the past, while strengthening the institutional controls that must characterize the conduct of the intelligence business in a democratic society.

In the production field, I intend to devote particular attention to:

- Establishing and monitoring priorities by geographic region, by topic and by type of product to assure we are covering the most important needs within available resources,
- Facilitating interdisciplinary approaches to analytic problems,
- Testing new and experimental techniques of analysis, and
- Making better use of computerized data bases in support of our analysts.

One example of the challenges confronting the Intelligence Community reinforces the need for improvement in all of these areas. The recent controversy over the long range strategic designs of the Soviet Union demonstrates once again that--although we have a vast data base from which to draw conclusions about Soviet capabilities--we are unlikely ever to know all we would like about the intentions of the Soviet decision makers. I will give the highest priority to those actions which strengthen our analytical capability so that we might better understand Soviet actions.

I already am aware of the serious resources limitations the Intelligence Community has. Manpower is down 46 percent since the peak of 1969. Purchasing power is down nearly a third from what it was in 1964. The seed money for new initiatives, such as have been the lifeblood of collection improvements over the past two decades, is now almost nonexistent.

On the other hand, users of intelligence are increasing thereby levying competing requirements against diminishing resources. To illustrate:

- Briefings and reports to Congressional committees and backup support to individual Congressmen preparing for overseas trips are a measurable part of this increase. The Office of Technical Assessment, an advisory arm of the Congress, receives briefings and background inputs, primarily from CIA, to their various studies on the consequences of technological changes and how these changes affect peoples lives.
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission receives extensive support from throughout the IC (CIA, DIA, NSA, ERDA, State/INR, the FBI) for data, analysis and back-up on matters related to nuclear proliferation, technology transfer and nuclear terrorism.
- In addition to our heavy foreign policy constituents in the NSC, State and Defense, we have significantly increased intelligence support to economic policy-makers in recent years:
  - o Treasury, Commerce, CEA and OMB are increasingly heavy consumers of economic intelligence.
  - o Agencies and departments with specialized needs for economic intelligence such as Agriculture, Labor, Transportation and the President's Special Trade Representative - all represent the increased emphasis on economic intelligence support.
  - o Members of the Economic Working Group, are, to the extent they wish, furnished briefings by a senior CIA analyst detailed to Treasury's Office of National Security, who in turn provides a conduit for study requests or other information from the IC.
  - o We expect that members of the Economic Working Group will seek continued intelligence support on issues of interest to the Group and to their individual departments and agencies.

- ° As one measurement of this support, in the second quarter of 1976, for example, CIA's Office of Economic Research completed 24 self-initiated studies and responded to 120 formal requests from 17 governmental departments and agencies, as well as the Congress. These requests came from all levels of the Administration, ranging from the Vice President to desk officers in State, Treasury and Commerce.

I have mentioned a few of the things to which I will give special attention in an effort to improve our performance despite these constraints. As I mentioned earlier, I will need your help and assistance, and look forward to learning more about your specific requirements for intelligence support.

Finally, I solicit your help in an area which is of major concern to me. All too often, there is conveyed to the public the impression not simply of secrecy of CIA operations but also of some sinister isolation and alienation of CIA from the rest of the Federal Government. We need your assistance to change the way in which the relationship between the CIA and the rest of the Federal Government is perceived in public, here and abroad.

<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE 1 March 1977
TO: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span>		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">Executive Registry</div>
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">77-3603</div>
REMARKS:		
<p>Attached is a list of consumers who were sent the <u>Guide</u>, the dates that their copies left the building.</p>		
FROM: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span>		
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FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY 77-3603)



22 December 1976

Who should get the Consumer's Guide?

Vice President - 20 Jan

Secretary of State - 20 Jan

Deputy Secretary of State

Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs

Under Secretary for Security Assistance

Counselor

Planning Coordinator

Director, ACDA

Secretary of Defense - 20 Jan

Deputy Secretary of Defense (1)

Deputy Secretary of Defense (2)

Chairman, JCS - 20 Jan

Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA

Secretary of the Army

Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of the Air Force

Secretary of the Treasury - 20 Jan

Deputy Secretary of the Treasury

Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs

Secretary of Commerce - 20 Jan

Secretary of Agriculture - 20 Jan

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Secretary of Labor

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - 20 Jan

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - 20 Jan

Staff Secretary, National Security Council - 20 Jan

Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs

Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs

Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs


Director, OMB - 20 Jan

Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers - 20 Jan

Administrator, ERDA

Ambassador Andrew J. Young - 31 Jan

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# **A Consumer's Guide to the Intelligence Community and Its Products**

March 1977

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